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I. INTRODUCTION
The constellation of trade arrangements has its own bright
stars, red dwarfs, and black holes. The hugely successful European
Community is a brilliant tar; the problematic Uruguay Round at
this writing is a red dwarf;' the U.S.-Mexico talks represents a
young star, while the erstwhile Latin American Free Trade Area is
a black hole. The question ahead is whether a shining new galaxy
1. See infra note 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Uruguay Round.
(Vol. 22:2-3
HEMISPHERIC TRADE
can be created for the Western Hemisphere.
In Parts One and Two, this Article reviews the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative2 and its Latin American response. Parts
Three and Four examine the main trade arrangements among
countries in the Western Hemisphere, and Parts Five and Six con-
clude this Article by speculating on the configuration of a new
Western Hemispheric trade order.
These conclusions are straightforward. Past attempts at forg-
ing free trade agreements within Latin America failed because they
did not meet certain obvious preconditions. These preconditions
are now coming into place for selected Latin American countries,
and the Enterprise Initiative makes possible trade agreements with
the United States. The result, in the first instance, will be a hub-
and-spoke architecture dealing with the most obvious border barri-
ers.' Eventually, this will be superseded by a "hub-spokes-rim" ar-
chitecture, and the agreements will be extended to reach behind
the border barriers to domestic economic issues. As companion in-
struments to the trade agreements, social pacts will likely be de-
vised, calling for better enforcement of existing health, safety, and
environmental standards and requiring a gradual improvement in
standards over time.
The timing of trade agreements will largely depend on exter-
nal events. Unless and until the crisis in Iraq is successfully re-
solved, President Bush will have neither the time nor the negotiat-
ing clout - neither with foreign nations nor with the U.S.
Congress - to mount major new initiatives. Beyond that, the Uru-
guay Round must come to a conclusion, and the proposed U.S.-
Mexico Free Trade Agreement must be worked out,4 before far
reaching trade talks are possible with other Latin American
nations.
II. ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
On June 27, 1990, President Bush offered proposals for closer
economic relations within the Western Hemisphere with his Enter-
2. See infra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of President Bush's Enter-
prise for the Americas Initiative.
3. See R WONNACOrr, U.S. HuB-AND-SPoKE BILATERALS AND THE MULTILATERAL TRAD-
ING SYsTam (C.D. Howe Inst. Commentary No. 23, 1990).
4. For further discussion on the proposed U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, see infra
text accompanying notes 89-94.
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prise for the Americas Initiative (Initiative).5 The Initiative is
broadly designed to support democratic governments and market-
oriented reforms through a program that will promote investment,
help reduce debt, and cut trade barriers.
In the investment arena, the Initiative seeks wholesale reform.
According to Treasury Undersecretary David Mulford, only two or
three Latin American and Caribbean nations currently maintain
what the United States would consider an open investment re-
gime.' In the debt arena, the Initiative basically combines self-help
with a modest amount of U.S. assistance.
The trade arena is the centerpiece of the entire Initiative, with
the ultimate goal being the creation of a Western Hemisphere free
trade zone. Assuming this goal is widely accepted in the United
States and Latin America, the key issues are how long it will take
to reach it and the tactics by which it will be achieved.
7
A. Trade
At this juncture, the Enterprise Initiative is short on trade
specifics, but its general goals are clear. First, the Initiative seeks
worldwide trade integration under the presumption that the Uru-
guay Round will succeed.' The successful completion of the talks
would likely increase the "integration of the Latin nations into the
global trading system." According to the Bush Administration, the
Initiative "is not an attempt by the United States to set up a re-
gional trade bloc, but it is an effort to lower trade barriers in the
region to the benefit of all trading nations."1 Within the frame-
work of the Uruguay Round, the United States has offered to assist
5. For the text of the President's statement, see President Bush's Address on "Enter-
prise for the Americas" Proposal and Accompanying White House Fact Sheet, Released
June 27, 1990 (Text), Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 125, at M-1 (June 28, 1990) [herein-
after Bush Initiative].
6. Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 5, 1990, at 2.
7. Crigler & Lande, Toward a Hemispheric Strategic Economic Alliance: Considera-
tion by the Council of the Americas, Manchester Trade, Feb. 14, 1990; and Trade Policy
Proposals Under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, Manchester Trade, Aug. 20,
1990.
8. The Uruguay Round describes a series of talks, designed to negotiate agreements on
tariffs to services and intellectual property, which began in 1986 in Uruguay between mem-
ber countries of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See Draft Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
MTN.TNCIW/35/Rzv. 1, Dec. 3,1990.
9. See Bush Initiative, supra note 5, at M-1.
10. Inside U.S. Trade, supra note 6, at 2.
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Latin American countries in addressing specific trade issues, and
has pledged support for tariff cuts on products of vital interest to
Latin American exporters.
Second, the Initiative seeks to open up a free trade zone
throughout the entire Western Hemisphere "stretching from the
port of Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego."" State Department
policymakers have declared "that intra-regional trade barriers
must fall and trade volume among Latin American countries and
the Caribbean must jump before any country in the hemisphere
other than Mexico and Chile will be ready to enter free trade talks
with the United States.""2 As a first step to this goal, however, the
United States has begun to negotiate bilateral framework agree-
ments on trade and investment in piecemeal fashion with a num-
ber of countries in the region. Seven countries - Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Mexico - already
had signed such agreements by the end of 1990;13 talks are pro-
ceeding with Venezuela and the Southern Cone countries (Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay); and the Andean Pact" might
well negotiate a framework agreement with the United States in
1992. The existing free trade agreement (FTA) with Canada15 and
the agreement now under discussion with Mexico"6 presumably will
serve as models for substantive content when the framework agree-
ments are succeeded by full-fledged trade agreements.
B. Investment
The Enterprise Initiative seeks to "help Latin American coun-
tries to compete for capital by reforming broad economic policies
and specific regulatory systems."' 7 To promote these objectives,
the Initiative contains proposals for two new programs to be ad-
ministered by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
11. Bush Initiative, supra note 5, at M-1.
12. Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 30, 1990, at 3.
13. Bush Hails Possibility of Hemispheric Free Trade Zone During South America
Trip, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 48, at 1824 (Dec. 5, 1990).
14. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Colombia, 8 I.L.M.
910 (1969) (hereinafter Cartagena Agreement]. For more discussion on the Andean Pact, see
infra text accompanying notes 42-60.
15. Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987, United States-Canada, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988)
[hereinafter U.S.-Canada FTA].
16. Understanding Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks, Oct. 3, 1989,
United States-Mexico, 29 I.L.M. 36 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico FTA Proposal].
17. Bush Initiative, supra note 5.
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First, the Initiative proposes that the IDB create a new invest-
ment sectoral loan program to provide both technical advice and
financial support for privatization efforts and liberalization of in-
vestment regimes - possibly coordinated with the World Bank.
This program would enhance both IDB and World Bank sectoral
lending facilities.
Second, the administration has proposed a multilateral invest-
ment fund to which the United States, the European Community,
and Japan would each contribute $100 million annually over the
next five years beginning in 1992. Additional contributions from
other countries could boost the fund total to $2 billion."8 The pro-
posed multilateral investment fund would provide annual grants
tied to investment reforms, support efforts to privatize govern-
ment-owned industries, and finance worker training, education,
and health programs. The fund is designed to create a climate
favorable to investment in Latin America, thereby attracting in-
creased amounts of private capital, including Latin flight capital
now residing in the United States and Europe, and to promote in-
vestment reforms in the region.
C. External Debt
Overall, Latin America's debt situation is still precarious.19
The external debt outstanding at the end of 1990 totalled $423 bil-
lion.20 Most countries in the region have not kept current on their
debt service and consequently ran up $12 billion in arrears in
1990.21
To deal with these debt issues, President Bush's "Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative Act of 1990" (EAI Bill)22 proposes that
18. This sum is comparatively small relative to the task at hand. The Initiative's diag-
nosis thus appears to be that policy reform is more important than cash. To quote the
President, "[Pirosperity in our hemisphere depends on trade - not aid." Id.
19. For most Latin countries, sharply higher oil prices in the wake of the Persian Gulf
crisis have curtailed the prospects for economic growth, at least through the first half of
1991. Mexico and Venezuela are big winners (perhaps together by $18 billion at an annual
rate), but other countries are losers (Brazil by nearly $4 billion at an annual rate). See
Tucker, Big Winners and Many Losers Watch the Price of Oil, Overseas Development
Council, Nov. 20, 1990; see also World Economy: Global Growth Slowing in 1991; Recession
Can Be Avoided, Daily Rep. for Execs., (BNA), No. 9, at S-27 (Jan. 14, 1991).
20. U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. PRELIMINARY
OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMY OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (1990).
21. Id.
22. H.R. 5855, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. 16,827.
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an Enterprise for the Americas Facility (Facility) be administered
by the Treasury Department in order to address debt reduction,
investment reform, and environmental protection. The Facility will
support debt reduction programs for countries that meet certain
eligibility requirements set out in the EAI Bill that are' designed to
promote a favorable investment climate. Each country should: 1)
establish an International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby arrange-
ment or an arrangement under the structural adjustment facility,
and institute an IMF monitored program or its equivalent in ex-
ceptional circumstances; 2) receive structural or sectoral loans
from the World Bank or the International Development Associa-
tion; 3) either establish major investment reforms in conjunction
with an IDB loan or implement an open investment regime; and 4)
negotiate a satisfactory financing program with commercial banks,
including debt and debt service relief if appropriate.2 3
When all these conditions are met, the United States would
provide new payment terms for outstanding debt "extended under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and credits extended pursuant
to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954
(PL 480 Aid). 24 The agency whose loans or credits are affected
will exchange - at the direction of the Facility - new obligations
for obligations outstanding as of January 1, 1990. The principal
and interest would be payable to the United States in U.S. dollars.
However, under the EAI Bill, interest at concessional rates
may be paid in local currency if the eligible country enters into a
framework agreement establishing an Environmental Fund. This
Fund would be jointly administered by the respective country and
the U.S. government to support local environmental projects. In
the absence of an environmental agreement, interest would be paid
in U.S. dollars into a special account.2 The Initiative also provides
for the sale, reduction, or cancellation of Export-Import Bank (Ex-
imbank) loans and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans,
provided the eligible country confirms that debt relief assistance
will be used to carry out debt-for-equity or debt-for-nature swaps.
As President Bush noted in his Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative, Latin American countries currently owe $12 billion to
23. Id.
24. Id.
.25. The EAI Bill is ambiguous as to whether the account might be conditionally
earmarked for the paying country. Id.
1991]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
the U.S. government.2 The Overseas Development Council has
calculated that the total extent of the U.S. debt initiative would, at
maximum, amount to a savings in interest payments of about $400
million annually, if the total $12 billion were forgiven. 7 If other
countries of the Paris Club join the plan, this amount might rise to
$1.6 to $2.3 billion - a fraction of the current annual net resource
transfer out of Latin America but significant in relation to what
the Brady Plan28 has delivered so far.29
III. LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE
The Bush Initiative was warmly received throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean. This reception reflects a fundamental
change of economic and political thinking in Latin America. Eco-
nomic policies of import-substitution and regulated markets are
rapidly being replaced by policies of freer trade, hospitality to for-
eign investment, and extensive deregulation.
For example, Bolivia, Mexico, and Jamaica have dramatically
and unilaterally liberalized their trade restrictions; Colombia and
Costa Rica have made significant progress; and Argentina and
Venezuela have recently initiated radical liberalization programs.8 0
Even Peru and Brazil have now taken first steps to open their
economies under new leaders elected in 1990. As a result of these
reforms, more and more countries in the region have become able
and willing to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).3
26. See Bush Initiative, supra note 5.
27. Hearings on H.R. 5855 Before the Subcomm. on International Development, Fi-
nance, Trade and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statement of Richard Feinberg, Exec. V.P. and Direc-
tor of Studies, Overseas Development Council) [hereinafter Hearings).
28. The Brady Plan, named for Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and put forth by
him in a March 1989 speech, describes a proposal to relieve Latin American debt through
certain debt-for-equity exchanges. Under these programs the U.S. purchases a country's for-
eign debt at a discount price, the debt is then converted into local currency by that coun-
try's central bank, and the currency is then invested back into that country's local
enterprises.
29. Hearings, supra note 27.
30. These trade policies complemented domestic stabilization policies in the second
half of the 1980s that sought to dampen inflationary pressures by cutting excessive govern-
ment expenditures and to increase efficiency in production through privatization and dereg-
ulation. See Williamson, The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America, INST. FOR INT'L
EcoN., at 24-26 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 1990).
31. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948). The cur-
[Vol. 22:2-3
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The Initiative is viewed as a chance to reap the benefits of
recent economic reforms by expanding trade and improving eco-
nomic efficiency. The Initiative is further seen as a welcome change
of U.S. policy from an emphasis on military assistance and security
considerations to an emphasis on closer economic relations.8 2 Fi-
nally, some Latin American nations support the Initiative as a de-
fensive strategy to cope with the perceived risk of U.S. protection-
ism (as did Canada), the feared decline of GATT authority, and
the possible rise of an inward-looking European bloc. 8
Despite this general atmosphere of enthusiasm, there are con-
cerns about the Initiative's shortcomings and intentions. For exam-
ple, Colombia's Finance Minister, Rudolf Hommes, speculated that
the Initiative could "introduce new economic inefficiencies" by
leading "to a specialization of the productive basis of [Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean] countries that is determined by the competi-
tive advantages that may exist with relation to the U.S. or Cana-
dian economies, but could not necessarily exist with respect to the
economies of the rest of the world. '3 4 Hommes criticizes the overall
proposal as not going far enough to facilitate the free movement of
people and the investment fund for being too small (compared, for
example, to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment capitalized at $12 billion).35 Other observers fear that the
whole Initiative could become hostage to the bargaining strategies
of commercial banks.36 Furthermore, the environmental part of the
rent version is at 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969), reprinted in J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 799 (1969). Chile, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Jamaica were already GATT members
by 1979. Colombia joined in 1979; Mexico joined in 1986; Costa Rica became the 100th
GATT signatory in November 1990; and ratification of Venezuela's protocol of accession is
expected shortly.
32. Caution Urged on Bush Plan; SELA's Experts Produce a Wary Report, Latin Am.
Weekly Rep., Sept. 20, 1990, at 6.
33. See, e.g., Latin America, Mexico: Bush Seen Pushing Hemispheric Trade Plan,
Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA), No. 11, at 5-10 (Jan. 16, 1991).
34. Five Latin Ministers Embrace Free Trade, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1990, at A-16. See
also Fin. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at 6 (wherein the Latin America Economic System (SELA)
expresses similar concerns).
35. Five Latin Ministers Embrace Free Trade, supra note 34, at A-16.
36. See Hearings, supra note 27. During President Bush's five-nation trip to South
America in early December 1990, the United States, Europe, and Japan cut off all new loans
from the Inter-American Development Bank to Brazil until the Collar government makes
significant progress with its commercial creditors. Officials Say Bush Is Either Reflecting
New Reality or Missing Opportunity, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1990, at A-16, col 6. Brazil has




Initiative has received scant notice, partly because interest pay-
ments to the Environmental Fund would, at best, amount to about
$50 million annually.
Overall, the trade part of the Bush Initiative has incited the
most interest. The vision of a Western Hemisphere free trade zone
is perceived as a remarkable advance in U.S.-Latin American rela-
tions, overshadowing the investment and debt pillars. This ap-
proaching free trade zone, however, will compel a close assessment
of the many pre-existing and emerging Latin American trade
agreements.
IV. EXISTING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS IN LATIN
AMERICA
If a new trade order is to emerge for the Western Hemisphere,
it must draw on the lessons of existing trade arrangements. Eco-
nomic integration is a perennial topic in Latin America, and the
list of bilateral and multilateral agreements is extensive. Owing to
an array of economic and political obstacles, none of the initiatives
has yet fulfilled its promise. There is no parallel within Latin
America to the European Community or even to the European
Free Trade Area.
However, beginnings of integration within Latin America are
now emerging. Argentina and Brazil first embarked on sectoral
trade integration and then entered into agreements aiming at over-
all trade integration.37 Mexico signed trade pacts with Chile and
Venezuela in 1990.38 Existing trade groups, like the Andean Pact
and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),89 expanded earlier
agreements.'0
However, only within the Southern Cone has intra-regional
trade growth been impressive, and that growth (68% between 1983
and 1989 (Table 1)) largely took place before association talks be-
gan. Inside the Andean Group, trade declined by 12% between
37. Mexico's Salinas Pushes Free Trade in Central, South American Tour, Christian
Sci. Mon., Oct. 5, 1990, at 4.
38. Id.
39. For further discussion on CARICOM, see infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
40. The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), formed by the Treaty of Mon-
tevideo in 1980, created an umbrella organization for the Andean Pact and the emerging
group of Southern Cone countries. The LAIA members represent approximately 90% of
Latin American population and GNP, and about 80% of exports. The main countries
outside LAIA are the Central American countries.
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1983 and 1989; within the Central American Common Market,
trade decreased by 17% (Table 1).41 For some countries, the intra-
regional export market in the late 1980s was of great importance
- for example, Bolivia (46%), Paraguay (30%), and Uruguay
(26%) (Table 1) -but for most countries Latin markets are far
less important than North American and European markets. As in-
tegration among these areas begins to take hold with the advent of
increased agreements, these markets are likely to increase in
importance.
A. The Andean Pact
In 1969, five Andean states - Bolivia, Columbia, Chile,
Equador, and Peru - signed the Agreement on Andean Subre-
gional Integration (Cartagena Agreement),4" thereby forming what
is known as the Andean Pact." This agreement arose out of grow-
ing dissatisfaction with the existing Latin American Free Trade
Area (LAFTA), which dated from 1960.44 The Andean Pact is now
composed of Bolivia, Columbia, Equador, Peru, and Venezuela.'5
Unlike LAFTA, which sought with little success to reduce tar-
iffs on a product-by-product basis, the Andean Group has freed
3,000 items from tariffs for intra-bloc trade.4" Although a common
external tariff has not been implemented, a degree of tariff harmo-
nization was achieved through a minimum common external tariff.
A 1990 study of the trade effects of the Andean Pact over the pe-
riod 1968 to 1977 found annual trade creation of about 18.4% of
total import values, offset by annual trade diversion of about
16.7% in the value of external imports. 7 The calculated net posi-
tive effect was thus only 1.7% annually, a fairly modest result.
41. The figures cited here refer to import growth. For various reasons, export statistics
for intra-group trade differ from import statistics. Correspondingly, trade growth stated in
terms of export data would be different, but the picture of stagnation would remain much
the same.
42. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, Bogota, 8 I.L.M. 910
(1969) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement].
43. Khazen & Clark, A Case Study of Effects of Developing Country Integration on
Trade Flows, 22 J. LATIN AM. STuDuts 317 (1990).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 318. Venezuela entered the Andean Pact in 1973. Final Act of the Negotia-
tions on the Entry of Venezuela into the Cartagena Agreement, Feb. 13, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 344
(1973). Chile left the Pact in 1976. Khazen & Clark, supra note 43, at 318.




Looking at the performance of the Andean Pact, two phases
can be observed. From 1970 to 1981, trade among member states
grew at an average rate of 22% annually, reaching $1.2 billion. Af-
ter 1981, however, trade declined within the region, and in 1989,
intra-Andean imports amounted to about $800 million (excluding
illicit drugs). Bilateral trade between Colombia and Venezuela ac-
counted for 58% of that total. By contrast, trade with the United
States in 1989 was about ten times greater than intra-Andean bloc
trade (see Table 1).
Historically, Andean Pact policies toward foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) have been less than liberal. The Andean nations
placed special emphasis on a common policy toward FDI and tech-
nology transfer, fearing that the process of integration would pro-
mote geographic concentration of various industries disproportion-
ately benefiting the advanced members. To counteract this
anticipated result, particular industries were assigned to each
country for the first ten years. Backing up the diversification pol-
icy, the Andean Pact's foreign investment code (Decision 24)48
aimed at spreading the activities of multinational enterprise across
all Andean members." Decision 24 tried to allocate foreign invest-
ment to predetermined areas and industries through a myriad of
guidelines.6 0 As a consequence of these regulations, investing firms,
whether domestic or foreign, were not allowed to seek the highest
prospective returns. 1 This contributed to an already weak invest-
ment climate resulting from macroeconomic mismanagement and
political instability.2
The latest policy initiatives coming to the Andean region in-
clude: (1) U.S. and E.C. attempts to promote legitimate commerce
48. The foreign investment code, formally entitled the "Common Regime for Treat-
ment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties," is more com-
monly referred to as Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, promul-
gated December 31, 1970. Decision 24 has since been replaced by Decision 220 as of May 18,
1987. See Weisenfeld, Decision 24 and Decision 220 of the Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement (Andean Foreign Investment Codes), Introduction, in I BAsic DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL EcONoMic LAW 581 (1990).
49. Khazen & Clark, supra note 43, at 319-20.
50. Weisenfeld, supra note 48, at 582.
51. Id.
52. The Quito Protocol of May 25, 1988 attempted to make Andean investment proce-
dures and regional industrial programming more flexible. See Weisenfeld, supra note 48, at
591. Progress was also made in lifting non-tariff barriers. Id. However, the scope of the
Quito Protocol was nowhere near as ambitious as the La Paz Agreement of November 1990.
See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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to deflect interest and participation in the drug trade under the
scheme of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); and (2)
the La Paz Agreement signed by five presidents, vowing to elimi-
nate most of the interventionist provisions of the original Andean
Pact. s
In late 1990, the European Community agreed under the GSP
to open unilaterally its market for certain Andean tropical prod-
ucts.5 4 The United States likewise agreed to give unilateral tariff
preferences to most goods exported from Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru,
and Colombia and to help farmers in the region reach global health
and safety standards, improve certification procedures and meet
certain labeling requirements." However, after a seven month U.S.
tariff review, only sixty-seven products - accounting for $27 mil-
lion of merchandise exports - were made eligible for special tariff
status under the GSP.
5
6
At a summit in La Paz on November 29-30, 1990, the five An-
dean Pact nations agreed to accomplish a true regional free trade
area by 1992 by abolishing internal tariffs under the La Paz Agree-
ment.57 The Andean countries have further agreed to establish
common external tariff rates during 1991 and implement these
rates by 1995, when a Andean customs union will be established.5
Meanwhile, all products will be eligible for tariff-free trade within
the Andean area by December 31, 1991, and administered trade
regimes will be abolished by 1992.'" Limits on private investment
in strategic industries are to be eliminated by June 30, 1991. Regu-
lations governing foreign investment, particularly those that pre-
vent foreign investors from taking advantage of the free trade area,
are to be modified before March 31, 1991.0 These sweeping initia-
tives are designed not only to create a unified Andean economy for
its own sake, but also to act as a substantial partner in negotia-
53. Andean Pact to End Internal Tariffs Before 1992, Reuters, Nov. 30, 1990.
54. J. Corn., July 24, 1990, at 11-A. See also, GSP Benefits Are Expanded, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), No. 30, at 1145 (July 25, 1990).
55. J. Com., July 24, 1990, at IIA.
56. Id.
57. Andean Pact to End Internal Tariffs Before 1992, Reuters, Nov. 30, 1990. The
agreement is formally known as the Agreement Regarding the Consolidation and Reschedul-
ing of Certain Debts Owed to, Guaranteed by, or Insured by the U.S. Government and Its
Agencies. Treaty Actions - Jan. 1991, U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch, Feb. 11, 1991.
58. Andean Pact to End Internal Tariffs Before 1992, supra note 53.
59. Id.
60. Unclassified Cable 16915 from U.S. Embassy at La Paz (Dec. 3, 1990) (available at
the U.S. State Dep't).
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tions with the United States.
B. Central American Common Market
The Central American Common Market (CACM) achieved
some results at its inception in the 1960s, but collapsed in the late
1970s."' Lately the CACM has been more of a paper creation than
a force for integration.6 2 The CACM members include El Salvador,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras.63 Three of these countries
- El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica - provide the bulk of
total CACM trade, accounting for 92% of all exports within the
area and for 84% of all imports from other member states. In the
1980s, ravaged by civil war and regional conflict, Central American
economic integration retrogressed.6 4 Between 1984 and 1986, intra-
regional trade decreased sharply (36%). Although trade flows have
recovered somewhat, the 1989 level of trade ($2.2 billion) was still
below the 1983 level ($2.3 billion) (Table 1).
CACM exports to the other two trade associations, the Andean
Pact and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CAR-
ICOM)," were lower in 1989 than 1983 (Table 1). By contrast,
trade with the United States has grown sharply and accounts for
almost half of the region's total trade (Table 1). Between 1983 and
1989, CACM exports to the United States rose from $1.6 billion to
$2.3 billion, while CACM imports from the United States more
than tripled from $1.5 billion to $4.8 billion (reflecting sharply
higher military purchases) (Table 1).
As their latest initiative, CACM members agreed, in January
1991, to negotiate sectoral free trade pacts with Mexico as part of a
broader program (including concessional oil sales) to strengthen bi-
lateral economic relations." These negotiations are expected to
lead to increased access to a wider range of products among these
nations.
6 7
61. Kaston, Capitalism from the Ashes, Policy Review, No. 48, at 72 (Spring 1989).
62. Id.
63. Nicaragua joined in 1956, giving the group nominal membership of the entire region
except Panama and Belize.
64. Id.
65. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, signed July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033
(1973)(entered into force Aug. 1, 1973) [hereinafter CARICOM].
66. Coone & Doulton, Mexico Signs Central American Free-Trade Accord, Fin. Times,





The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), founded in 1973, in-
cludes thirteen English-speaking Caribbean nations with a popula-
tion of 5.5 million. e8 From 1981 to 1986, persistent shortages of for-
eign exchange, due to weak export prices and volumes for
petroleum, bauxite, and sugar, prompted a considerable decline in
intra-regional trade. 9 However, member trade has expanded since
1987, increasing by 20% in 1989 to reach $317 million.70
In a meeting in October 1990 in Kingston, Jamaica, the lead-
ers of CARICOM continued to emphasize further economic inte-
gration as a means to deal with emerging regional trading blocs in
North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia.71 CARICOM may en-
large by accepting new members, such as Haiti, Surinam, and the
Dominican Republic.72 Leaders also agreed on a Common External
Tariff, effective April 1, 1991, with special provisions worked out
for vulnerable sectors. 73 Moreover, in 1991, new rules will allow
duty-free and restriction-free movement of CARICOM-produced
goods between the member states.7 ' Finally, the CARICOM Stock
Exchange is scheduled to open by January 1, 1992. By 1994, lead-
ers expect to achieve currency alignment among member states."5
U.S.-Caribbean trade relations have not yet fulfilled the ex-
pectations that were raised by the Caribbean Basin Initiatives of
President Reagan (CBI I) and President Bush (CBI II).71 These
initiatives essentially promised one-way free trade, but nearly all
products of current commercial interest to the Caribbean nations
were excluded.77 Since 1983, total exports of the Caribbean Com-
munity to the United States have in fact been halved from $4.6
billion to only $2.3 billion annually. Other factors were also at
68. See CARICOM, supra note 65. CARICOM replaced the Caribbean Free Trade As-
sociation, CARIFTA, which was founded in 1965.
69. J. Com., June 5, 1990, at 6-B.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Update information was provided by the Eastern Caribbean Investment Promotion
Service (ECIPS).
73. J. Com., supra note 69, at 6-B.
74. Id. The rule of origin provision requires "substantial transformation" for goods
made with foreign materials to qualify for free movement to other CARICOM countries.
75. Id.
76. President Bush recently signed the revised Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI II) into
law as part of the Customs and Trade Act of 1990. See Region Assesses Impact of CBI-II,




work 78 but the two CBIs did not noticeably help the Caribbean
states overall to increase their exports to the United States. The
Caribbean Community still seeks duty-free and quota-free conces-
sions on exports to the United States of so-called "sensitive" items:
textiles and apparel, leather products, sugar, and fruits and
vegetables.
D. Southern Cone
The Southern Cone - comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay, and Uruguay - appears to be in the process of reformation.
In April 1988, the leaders of the two primary Southern Cone coun-
tries, Presidents Sarney of Brazil and Alfonsin of Argentina, signed
an industrial complementary agreement in April 1988 to coordi-
nate policies in their auto, food, aircraft, and other industries.
Since then, the pace of integration has increased, and new bilateral
and multilateral agreements are in the making.
In July 1990, the new leaders of Argentina and Brazil, Presi-
dents Carlos Menem and Fernando Collor de Mello, respectively,
agreed to form a common market by the end of 1994.1' Recently,
Uruguay and Paraguay indicated that they would be interested in
joining an integrated Southern Cone Market.80 These announce-
ments came only a few days after President Bush proposed the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.
Chile has been mentioned as a possible member of the South-
ern Cone subregion. However, Chile is more likely to "go it alone"
through negotiations with the United States. Chile has outpaced
all the other countries in the region in the speed of its economic
reforms"1 and prefers to negotiate a FTA with the United States
78. For example, the worldwide drop in oil prices in the mid 1980s caused reduced
exports of oil from Trinidad & Tobago, the Bahamas and the Netherland Antilles. See id.
79. Brazil-Argentine Common Market in 1995, Latin Am. Reg. Rep.: Brazil, Aug. 16,
1990, at 4.
80. Collor and Menem Take Pragmatic Line on Common Market, Fin. Times, Sept. 21,
1990. On March 26, 1991, two months after this symposium, the Presidents of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed an agreement in Asuncion, creating a future Southern
Cone common market known as Mercosur. Southern Cone Governments Sign Mercosur
into Existence, Latin Am. Weekly Rep., Apr. 4, 1991, at 1. The Treaty of Asuncion aims to
reduce intra-regional export tariffs down to zero by the end of 1994. Id.
81. From 1983 to 1989, Chile's imports from and exports to the Southern Cone grew by
172% and 113%, respectively, while the Southern Cone's intra-regional imports grew by
129% (Table 1). The Southern Cone's imports from the Andean Pact and CARICOM de-
creased by 46% and 3%, respectively (Table 1). However, Chile boosted its export trade to
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far more quickly than would be possible if it had to wait for its
neighbors to catch up.82 Chilean efforts seem to be bearing fruit.
During his visit to Chile in December 1990, President Bush put
prospective FTA talks on the near-term agenda, and U.S. Trade
Representative Carla Hills reinstated Chile as a beneficiary under
the U.S. generalized system of preferences (GSP). a3
V. U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
8 4
The United States' free trade agreement with Canada (U.S.-
Canada FTA)85 will inevitably serve as a reference point both for
talks with Mexico and for wider hemispheric negotiations. Given
the disparities in income between the United States and Latin
American countries, however, one should not expect bold progress
on trade liberalization comparable to the U.S.-Canada FTA. More-
over, based on the Canadian precedent, Latin American nations
should not expect an FTA to come into place quickly or to in-
stantly solve their economic ills.
The United States and Canada had substantial economic ties
before entering bilateral trade negotiations. In 1986, U.S. merchan-
dise exports to Canada accounted for 25% of total U.S. exports,
and U.S. imports from Canada accounted for 19% of total U.S.
imports.8 e Trade ties were even more substantial from the Cana-
dian perspective. Canadian merchandise exports to the United
States accounted for 77% of Canadian exports, and imports ac-
counted for 67%.87 Comparable dependence on U.S. commercial
ties is evident for Mexico (see Table 2). For Chile and the South-
ern Cone of Latin America, trade with the United States is about
the United States by only 49% as compared with an export increase of more than 60%
between the Southern Cone and the U.S. (Table 1).
82. Bush Hails Possibility of Hemispheric Free Trade Zone During South American
Trip, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 8, at 1824 (Dec. 5, 1990).
83. Chile Seeks Closer U.S. Trade Ties, Wall St. J., Jan. 8, 1991, at A10, at col. 4; Fin.
Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at 14.
84. For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see Schott, United States-Canada Free
Trade: An Evaluation of the Agreement, PA 24, INsT. FOR INT'L ECON. (April 1988); Schott
& Smith, The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: The Global Impact, INST. FOR
INT'L ECON. (1988).
85. U.S.-Canada FTA, supra note 15. The United States also has a free trade agree-
ment with Israel and a preferential trading arrangement with the Caribbean. These agree-
ments, however, have a very small fraction of the economic impact of the U.S.-Canada
agreement.
86. Schott, supra note 84; Schott & Smith, supra note 84.
87. Schott, supra note 84, at 10-11.
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20% of total trade, while for the rest of Latin America the figure
approaches 50% (see Table 1).
The Shamrock Summit between President Reagan and Prime
Minister Mulroney in March 1985, in Quebec City, set both coun-
tries on the track toward bilateral trade liberalization. The broad
goal was to establish a climate of predictability and confidence for
both Canadian and United States firms to plan, invest, grow, and
compete more effectively with one another and in the global mar-
ket. After more than a century of false starts, U.S.-Canadian FTA
negotiations began fourteen months after they were first broached
and then took another seventeen months to conclude;"s even then,
some issues still proved so sensitive that the agreement fell short
of expectations (notably, in transportation services, intellectual
property, and "unfair" trade remedies).
Any trade agreements between the United States and Latin
American countries will likewise take time to negotiate, and, inevi-
tably, difficult and sensitive issues will arise. The following
paragraphs summarize key elements of the U.S.-Canada FTA.
A. Tariffs
The U.S.-Canada FTA seeks to eliminate all tariffs between
the two countries over a ten-year period. Tariffs on some products
were eliminated immediately, but most tariffs were scheduled to be
eliminated over five to ten years in equal annual installments.
However, since the FTA went into force, both countries have
agreed to accelerate tariff cuts on a broad range of products during
two subsequent tariff reviews. The FTA has thus fortified the mo-
mentum for trade reform. The U.S.-Canada pattern of tariff liber-
alization sets a good standard for a broader Western Hemisphere
compact, although in many cases the cuts would. need to be phased
asymmetrically, meaning larger cuts in the early years by the
United States.
88. The talks opened in May 1986; a draft agreement was initialed on October 3, 1987;
the final text was completed on December 11, 1987; it was signed by President Reagan and
Prime Minister Mulroney on January 2, 1988. Subsequently, after a bruising political battle





The FTA expanded on obligations that both countries had al-
ready undertaken in the GATT Code on Government Procure-
ment. It also lowered the threshold of the contract value from
$171,000 to $25,000 for the application of competitive bidding pro-
cedures and other GATT rules.
C. Energy
The FTA contains commitments not to impose restrictions on
imports and exports - including quotas, taxes, or price require-
ments - with limited exceptions for national security and short
supply circumstances. It thereby guarantees market access for Ca-
nadian producers and reliable supplies for U.S. consumers. This
issue will undoubtedly take on added importance in the aftermath
of the Persian Gulf crisis.
D. Agriculture
The FTA eliminated agricultural tariffs and removed some
non-tariff barriers, but major farm policies in each country were
left unchanged - supposedly to be reformed through Uruguay
Round talks. The inclusion of agricultural liberalization in future
regional trade pacts will depend importantly on the extent of re-
forms reached in GATT talks.
E. Investment
The FTA eliminated the screening requirements for most U.S.
greenfield investments and indirect U.S. acquisitions in Canada.
By 1992, the threshold for screening direct acquisitions will be in-
creased, so that it will only apply to the top 600-plus Canadian
firms. Moreover, the FTA bars the introduction of new trade-re-
lated performance requirements. However, important exemptions
to several of these provisions limit their application to the energy
and cultural sectors.
F. Automotive Trade
Under the FTA, Canada agreed to eliminate immediately its
export-based duty remission scheme, to phase out its production-
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based incentive scheme by 1995, to remove its embargo on used car
imports within five years, and not to extend the benefits of' the
Auto Pact to new companies that establish assembly plants in Ca-
nada. The FTA also increased somewhat the North America con-
tent rule that must be met for a company to benefit from bilateral
duty-free trade.
G. Resolution of Subsidy/Countervail and Antidumping
Problems
Much to the disappointment of Canada, no new rules were
reached on the application of countervailing duties (CVD) and an-
tidumping duties (ADD). The FTA committed both countries to
continue negotiating a harmonized regime on subsidy/CVD and
ADD over a five to seven year period. The FTA also established ex
post procedures to resolve disputes about the consistency of final
CVD and ADD orders with existing national laws and GATT obli-
gations. Disputes on subsidy/CVD and ADD issues are subject to
binding arbitration.
H. Services
The FTA established a framework of rights and obligations re-
garding national treatment, establishment, and licensing and certi-
fication procedures. In addition, FTA provisions facilitate the tem-
porary cross-border movement of professional workers (the only
provisions relating to trade in labor services). Most existing restric-
tions were "grandfathered," although significant liberalization was
achieved in the financial services sector. The FTA removed restric-
tions on U.S. banks - notably the 16% limit on total banking as-
sets that foreign subsidiaries may hold in the Canadian market -
and relaxed a restrictive rule on U.S. insurance groups operating in
Canada.
L Dispute Settlement
The FTA established a Canada-U.S. Trade Commission, com-
posed of trade ministers and their representatives, to supervise the
operation of the FTA and to resolve all disputes except those relat-
ing to subsidy/CVD and antidumping matters (which are handled
through their own arbitration mechanism) and financial services
(which are handled through a consultative system between the
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U.S. Treasury and the Canadian Department of Finance).
VI. THE ROAD TO A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AREA
The announcement that the United States and Mexico will be-
gin negotiations on an FTA breathes political life into the idea of a
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Coming on the heels
of the U.S.-Canada FTA (ratified in 1989), the U.S.-Mexico trade
and investment pact (signed October 1989),"' and the recent Ca-
nada-Mexico framework agreement (signed in March 1990), the
prospective U.S.-Mexico talks have broad implications for eco-
nomic relations between the three countries of North America. Ne-
gotiations between the United States and Mexico will likely begin
in Spring 1991, assuming Congress consents to the applicability of
fast-track procedures to implement the prospective pact.90 An
agreement would probably be ready by Spring 1992. Canada will
also be actively involved in the talks, though (as of late January
1991) a decision had not been taken whether its role will be as an
active participant or merely consultative."
A two-part process could furnish the modalities to secure the
interests of the United States, Mexico, and Canada, if trilateral ne-
gotiations do not supersede the bilateral U.S.-Mexico talks. First, a
separate agreement focusing both on tariffs and sectoral issues
(e.g., autos, pharmaceuticals, and energy) will likely be negotiated
between the United States and Mexico. This would answer Mex-
ico's interest in the rapid conclusion of a bilateral FTA and would
avoid the complications of trilateral negotiations. Second, a sepa-
rate North American steering group comprised of the three coun-
tries could begin to plan for a NAFTA - by harmonizing U.S.-
Mexico provisions (in a technical sense) with the provisions of the
Canada-U.S. FTA and by devising ways to develop common rules
of origin, administrative provisions, and dispute settlement
procedures.
89. Mexico-United States Understanding Regarding the Joint Committee for Invest-
ment and Trade, Oct. 3, 1989, Washington, D.C., 29 I.L.M. 36 (1990).
90. Latin America, Mexico: Bush Seen Pushing Hemispheric Trade Plan, Daily Rep.




A. Goals of the Partners
Mexico, Canada, and the United States each have their own
reasons for pursuing a North American Free Trade Area. The ex-
tent of mutuality will largely determine the scope and pace of
talks.
1. Mexico
As the smallest and most protected economy, Mexico has the
most to gain over time from a NAFTA. An agreement would rein-
force and accelerate the pace of domestic reforms currently under-
way and would guarantee access to the broader North American
market. Further, an open trade policy could help alleviate Mexico's
crippling debt service burden and help finance the current account
deficit by encouraging foreign direct investment and the return of
flight capital (statistics on Mexican trade patterns appear in Table
2).
2. Canada
Canadian interests in a NAFTA are more defensive than Mex-
ican interests. Canada wants to maintain its position as a player in
the dialogue between Mexico and the United States, to safeguard
Canadian rights under the U.S.-Canada FTA, and to deal with
such questions as trade in automobiles and parts and natural gas
flows. In some instances, Canada and Mexico may find common
commercial interests juxtaposed with the United States.
3. United States
U.S. interests lie both in the political and economic areas. Ec-
onomic growth should promote a stable and democratic regime in
Mexico, providing a good model for other countries in the region.
The FTA would reinforce ongoing trade and investment reforms in
Mexico, and thus likely contribute to increased economic growth.
Many Fortune 500 manufacturing firms are looking to the global
advantages of safe investment and production in Mexico. A pros-
perous Mexico would become a thriving market for U.S. exports,
providing a particular boost to the economies of border states such
as California, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. At the same time,
growth in the Mexican economy would create new jobs and in-
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crease wages in Mexico and thus help stem the tide of illegal immi-
gration. Finally, in the face of a rapidly integrating European Com-
munity, a North American Free Trade Area has political appeal in
showing that "we can do it, too."
For both Canada and the United States, however, an economic
partnership with a low-wage country with nearly ninety million
people could have enormous consequences. Labor-intensive and
machine-driven industries in Canada and the United States -
fruits and vegetables, textiles, automobiles and parts, household
equipment, and consumer electronics - could significantly con-
tract over a period of ten or fifteen years. On the other hand, Ca-
nada and the United States should gain greatly from increased ex-
ports of sophisticated products and services to Mexico and from
the ability to draw on Mexican labor and resources to compete in
world markets.
B. Impact on Third World Countries
Estimates indicate that, over a five year period, trade creation
of a U.S.-Mexico agreement, coming on top of the U.S.-Canada
FTA, will greatly outweigh trade diversion. 2 Eliminating U.S. tar-
iffs on Mexican products would increase Mexican exports to the
United States by about $1.4 billion in the early 1990s, and elimi-
nating both tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) would increase
Mexican exports by about $2.8 billion. Mexican exports of cloth-
ing, machinery, transportation equipment, and fruit and vegetables
will especially benefit from the trade pact. Total trade diversion
would probably not exceed $0.4 billion. The diversion effect on
Central and South America is estimated, at worst, at under $0.2
billion. If sector-specific deals on NTBs come at the expense of
third country suppliers, however, the diversion effect could become
much more pronounced.
C. Agenda
The agenda for both the bilateral U.S.-Mexico agreement and
the trilateral NAFTA will likely follow the model of the Canada-
U.S. FTA, including negotiations on specific sectoral issues.
Broader economic issues such as monetary integration and labor
92. The figures in this paragraph are based on data provided by Sam Laird, Interna-
tional Economics Division, World Bank.
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mobility will be excluded from an agreement. However, U.S. labor
unions and environmental and consumer groups are pressing for
the inclusion of social issues involving environmental, workplace,
health, and safety standards, as well as drug trafficking.
1. Tariffs and Quotas
Mexico has reduced its average weighted tariff to about 10%,
set a maximum rate of 20%, and has substantially harmonized its
tariff schedule. The United States already extends tariff prefer-
ences to Mexico under the General System of Preferences and
HTS categories 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80 (formerly TSUS 806.30
and 807.00, provisions that underpin maquiladora operations).
Non-tariff barriers likely to be targeted for liberalization include
U.S. steel quotas (in case they do not expire as scheduled in March
1992), Mexican local content and export requirements in the auto
industry, and both U.S. and Mexican quotas in agriculture and
textiles and apparel. These sectors, of course, will also be targeted
by opponents of trade liberalization in an effort to derail trade
talks entirely or at least exempt the sectors from coverage. In addi-
tion, questions remain concerning the timing of tariff phase-outs
and special treatment for impacted industries.
2. Agriculture
This sector is beset by layers of barriers in the form of tariffs,
quotas, and phytosanitary regulations. The United States has a
wide number of specific duties on fruits and vegetables, which
range up to 38% ad valorem. Both the United States and Mexico
also impose extensive import licensing controls on agricultural
products. The U.S. quotas are hard on sugar, fruits and vegetables
(fourteen commodities are subject to marketing orders with a
strong seasonal component); Mexican quotas are hard on U.S.
grain exports, especially during the Mexican harvest season. The
United States is worried both about Mexican pests and animal dis-
eases making their way north and about pesticide levels on crops.
3. Energy
The energy sector holds the greatest promise for big new U.S.
investment, but is politically explosive for Mexico. Ownership and
control of the energy sector has been reserved for the government
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since 1938. Mexico desperately needs foreign capital to upgrade ag-
ing machinery and gain technology to exploit difficult new fields.
With rising domestic consumption and flat or declining production,
Mexico would become an oil importer by the year 2000 in the ab-
sence of major new investments. The recent $1.5 billion Eximbank
loan - possibly expanding to $6.5 billion over the next few years
- gives American oil-service companies access to Mexican oil-de-
velopment projects. 3 However, it remains an open question
whether Mexico can attract participation by foreign companies
with the advanced technologies needed to explore and exploit its
oil reserves. American oil companies rankle because they are still
prohibited from direct equity investment in the Mexican oil
industry.
4. Automotive Industry
Mexico has a highly regulated automobile industry. FTA nego-
tiators are likely to discuss issues such as safety standards in facto-
ries, import restrictions under the 1989 Mexican Auto Decree
(which limits imports to 15% of domestic sales in 1991 and 1992),
export requirements (exports must be a multiple of imports, 1.75
by 1994), value added requirements (36% local content to be sup-
plied by locally owned firms), and investment limitations. The
1989 Decree has been applauded by auto producers, but is disliked
by U.S. and Canadian auto parts manufacturers. The interaction
between the U.S.-Mexico FTA and the U.S.-Canada Auto Pact
raises fears in Canada that the whole industry will move south.
The key element in the negotiations will thus involve the establish-
ment of common rules of origin.
5. Services
An agreement on services would build on the model of the
U.S.-Canada FTA and on the provisions of the prospective General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that is being developed in
the Uruguay Round. The GATS will likely contain a framework of
rights and obligations that stress transparency of regulations and
the application of the national treatment principle and that liber-
alize trade through an evolutionary process, sector by sector, start-
93. Bush Makes Progress on Trade Issues in Mexico, Gains Supports for Gulf Policy,
Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1990, at A24, col. 2.
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ing from the baseline of existing policies. All this is facilitated by
Mexican privatization of its banking and telecommunications
sectors.
6. Maquiladora
Maquiladoras94 have drawn criticism from factions both within
the United States and Mexico. Problems include low average wages
in Mexico, exploitation of young and female workers, low unioniza-
tion, and inadequate health and safety standards in the workplace.
These are all issues likely to be revisited in prospective U.S. nego-
tiations with other countries or regions in the hemisphere. How-
ever, maquila operations offer two benefits for the United States:
maquila imports are an alternative to goods from East Asia and
lead to a larger backflow of U.S. exports to Mexico, and maquilas
reduce emigration to the United States, by providing jobs for
about 440,000 Mexicans.
7. Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Laws
Prospective results in the Uruguay Round do not hold great
promise for reforming the multilateral GATT rules that govern na-
tional countervailing duty (CVD) and antidumping (ADD) pro-
ceedings. Given the experience of the U.S.-Canada talks, bilateral
and regional pacts will likewise only be able to make small, incre-
mental reforms. An agreement on CVD and ADD could start, how-
ever, by including a dispute settlement procedure along lines simi-
lar to the U.S.-Canada FTA procedures. Over time, the ADD
regime could be supplemented and eventually supplanted by a
common competition policy standard. In the distant future, it
might be possible to negotiate a NAFTA code limiting domestic
subsidies, as well as export subsidies, so that CVD proceedings
dwindle in number and importance.
94. Maquiladoras are export manufacturing firms located in Mexico which are foreign-
owned but do not pay tariffs on the component parts they import for assembly, thus reduc-
ing the overall cost of manufacturing and exporting goods to the U.S. See Mulligan, Inter-
national Trade: What Does the Future Hold?, Tax. LAW., Jan. 21, 1991, at 24; Latin
America, Mexico: Bush Seen Pressing Hemispheric Trade Plan, Daily Rep. for Execs.
(BNA) No. 11, at S-10.
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VII. LESSONS FOR THE HEMISPHERE
The successes and failures of past trade agreements suggest
various lessons for new efforts to achieve free trade within the
hemisphere. Those lessons can be grouped under three headings:
preconditions, timing, and subject matter.
A. Preconditions for a Trade Agreement
More often than not, free trade agreements are concluded be-
tween countries with similar levels of per capita income. Many so-
cial conditions correlate with per capita income: for example, gen-
eral wage levels, minimum wage legislation, health and safety rules
for the workplace, social safety nets (old age, health, and welfare
assistance), environmental controls, and educational standards.
When such social conditions are similar, the trauma of economic
integration is much reduced. In two major instances of pronounced
social disparities, the richer partner agreed to help the poorer part-
ner with very substantial flows of financial assistance. Thus, when
the European Community was enlarged to include Greece, Spain,
and Portugal, a massive regional assistance program was inaugu-
rated to improve the infrastructure in poorer parts of Europe.
Likewise, when the German Democratic Republic was reunited
with the Federal Republic, the Federal Republic committed huge
amounts of money to a broad reconstruction program.
Obviously, per capita income disparities between the United
States and Latin American nations are great - more than a factor
of ten in the case of the United States and Mexico. It is most un-
likely that large-scale financial assistance programs will be devised
to bridge the ensuing social disparities. Other solutions will have to
be devised.
In addition to finding imaginative solutions to ease concerns
about vast social disparities, five preconditions will need to be met
before worthwhile trade agreements can be negotiated between the
United States and single Latin nations or groups of countries.
When those conditions are met, a trade agreement can act as an
archstone holding together the pillars of a functioning, growth-ori-
ented economy.
The first precondition is a reasonable degree of monetary sta-
bility. Experience teaches that high average inflation rates, year-
to-year, are also highly variable rates, year-to-year. Highly variable
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inflation wrenches and twists the economy: not all prices and
wages rise and fall at the same rate. In particular, with high and
variable inflation, enormous shifts in the real exchange rate are
bound to occur (Table 3), which alternately exposes the traded
goods sector to mania and depression. In manic episodes, partner
countries will inevitably complain about unfair trade subsidized by
a cheap exchange rate; in depressive moods, home country indus-
tries will certainly seek, and often obtain, protection against im-
ports. This was the experience of the United States in the first half
of the 1980s, when a rapid fall in inflation and a superstrong dollar
led to a wave of protection in automobiles, steel, and other prod-
ucts. It is a recurring experience in Latin America.
The second precondition is a willingness to accept the tenets
of a market economy and to reject the teachings of statism. Possi-
bly the most important effect of lowered trade barriers is increased
competitive pressure on domestic industry. Such pressure is
stoutly resisted by state-run firms, which are usually the victim of
two forces. First, employees and managers come to think of them-
selves as tenured workers. In turn, this makes it necessary to main-
tain output, even when the goods are rejected by the market; and
it makes it hard to introduce efficiencies that entail staff layoffs.
Second, cozy relations develop with domestic supplying industries,
and these relations virtually equate to buy-national preferences.
When a large part of industry operates under state control, free
trade is at best a nuisance. Neither on the production side nor on
the purchasing side do state enterprises wish to respond to market
signals, and their first line of defense will be to block those signals
by undermining the trade agreement.
On an index from zero (backsliding toward statism) to four
(embrace of private markets), some Latin countries may be scored
as follows for their performance in the 1980s. In the category of 4:
Chile and Mexico (the amazing transition from Lopez Portillo to
Salinas); in the category of 3: Costa Rica, Jamaica, Bolivia, Vene-
zuela, and Argentina; in the category of 2: Colombia; in the cate-
gory of 1: Brazil; in the category of zero: Peru90 A more recent
report card on government policies and officials, based on evalua-
tions of corporate executives and analysts, leads to the following
scores for 1990: Chile and Mexico, 3; Brazil, Colombia and Vene-
95. Williamson, The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America, PA 28, INST. FOR
INT'L ECON., at Table 10 (Jan. 1990).
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zuela, high 2; Argentina, Peru, Ecuador and Uruguay, low 2." Evi-
dently, 1990 elections in both Brazil and Peru installed new re-
gimes that moved each country up the scale.
The third precondition is an ability and willingness of the gov-
ernment to look to other revenue sources than imposts on interna-
tional transactions. When import tariffs and export taxes form a
large part of government revenues, it will be very difficult for gov-
ernments to accept even the first step in any trade agreement
which looks to the phase-out of these charges. As Table 3 shows,
Latin countries vary enormously in their dependence on import
tariffs and export taxes.
The fourth precondition is trade linkage. At least one of the
partner countries needs to depend significantly on trade with the
other. This dependence establishes the raison d'6tre for the negoti-
ation: to receive preferential trade treatment in order to secure and
expand access to the partner's market. The clearest examples of
this point are in North America, where both Canada and Mexico
rely on the U.S. market for the preponderant share of their trade.
The final precondition, vital in any trade agreement with the
United States (or the European Community, for that matter), is a
functioning democracy. Within the United States, there will always
be economic opponents to a free trade agreement. These oppo-
nents will usually be able to carry the day against proposed conces-
sions to a dictator or a military government. Moreover, the United
States has a long history of applying economic sanctions against
Latin nations (twenty-five cases since the Second World War).97 A
trade agreement with a dictatorship will often be at risk of inter-
ruption by the United States.
Sometimes, as in the U.S.-Canada agreement or the Australia-
New Zealand agreement, these five preconditions have been in
place for a very long period before the trade agreement was
reached. But that need not always be the case. The idea of the
European Economic Community gathered force in the early 1950s,
only a few years after the Second World War and the rule of fas-
cism in Germany and Italy. In Europe, the Treaty of Rome was
seen as the archstone of a democratic peaceful continent and a way
to lock-in liberal economic and political institutions. Similarly, the
U.S.-Mexico FTA, if it succeeds, will come into place when mone-
96. See Latin Finance, Dec. 1990, at 36-37.
97. HUFBAUER, SCHOrr & ELLIOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (2d ed. 1990).
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tary stability is a recent achievement in Mexico, and just as stat-
ism is being dismantled.
This Article takes the view that a long record of democracy,
free markets, and monetary stability is not required. Instead, the
focus should be on recent events and on trends as much as levels.
Even so, conditions are radically different from country to country,
which brings us to issues of timing.
B. Timing
In his June 27, 1990 speech launching the Enterprise Initia-
tive, President Bush stated that he is willing to negotiate with
every single country on a bilateral basis or, if possible, with groups
of countries." Not everything can be done at once. There are two
main timing issues. The first is the time sequence between hemi-
spheric negotiations and U.S.-Mexico and NAFTA negotiations.
The second is the priority of countries or country groups in their
negotiations with the United States. Taken together, timing con-
siderations point, in the first instance, to a "hub-and-spoke" model
rather than a "hub-spoke-rim" model."e In a "hub-and-spoke"
model, the United States is the "hub" while Canada, Mexico, and
later individual Latin American countries are the "spokes." Only
when the "spokes" join together will there be a "hub-spoke-rim"
system.
In the best of all possible worlds, free trade would be achieved
through a single plurilateral trade agreement rather than separate
bilateral pacts between the United States, Canada, Mexico, and
other countries in the region. Ronald Wonnacott argues that the
bilateral approach will create a "discriminatory, inefficient, hub-
and-spoke trading structure" that would benefit the United States
(the "hub") more than its trading partners (the "spokes"), and
could erode prospects for future multilateral liberalization. 00
However, Wonnacott's argument is a case of the best being the
enemy of the good. The logic for starting with a hub-and-spoke
system is the "drop-lock" argument. At different times, different
Latin countries will meet the preconditions for a worthwhile agree-
ment. If the moment is not seized, there may well be policy retro-
98. See Bush Initiative, supra note 5.




gression. Moreover, it is unlikely that the preconditions will be met
for a large group of Latin countries at a single point in time in the
near to medium term.
There is much to be said for delaying substantive hemispheric
trade talks until the U.S.-Mexico FTA is wrapped up sometime in
1992, and the shape of a broader NAFTA is articulated.10' This
short delay, while framework agreements are being implemented'0
will allow countries in Latin America a better opportunity to
achieve the preconditions for a meaningful trade agreement. More-
over, in political terms, the United States can only digest so much
trade liberalization within a two-year time frame. U.S.-Mexico
talks are sure to provoke the U.S. fruit and vegetable and textile
industries, and other U.S. industries, notably petroleum and auto-
mobiles, will be watching carefully to see whether they are getting
from Mexico as much as they "deserve." The political circuits
might well be overloaded by the simultaneous negotiation of free
trade agreements with additional Latin countries.
This does not mean a halt to diplomatic initiatives for the
next two years. Seven Latin American nations have already signed
bilateral trade and investment agreements with the United States;
Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay are wrapping up the re-
maining details for similar framework agreements;"0 ' the CAR-
ICOM countries have experience with two Caribbean Basin Initia-
tives; and the Andean Pact might negotiate a framework
agreement in 1992. These agreements are essential precursors for
trade negotiations. The question ahead is the priority sequence of
countries and country-groups for full-fledged talks. There are two
that stand out in readiness terms: Chile and the CARICOM
nations.
As a single medium-sized country, Chile is the most obvious
candidate. Chile has expressed a keen interest in talks with the
United States. Democracy, free markets, monetary stability, and
low reliance on tariffs all characterize Chile. In his December 1990
visit to Santiago, President Bush proclaimed that "Chile has
moved further, faster than any other nation in South America to-
ward real free-market reform" and declared the country a prime
101. This timetable requires that President Bush emerge victorious, in both military
and international political terms, from the crisis in Iraq.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
103. Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 30, 1990, at 3.
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candidate for debt relief under the Enterprise Initiative."'
The CARICOM group is also eager for a free trade arrange-
ment. The main obstacle is U.S. reluctance to grant duty-free con-
cessions on U.S. imports of "sensitive products" - textiles, petro-
leum products, footwear, and leather goods - as part of the
revised Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI II). These issues are still
on the table and the Caribbean nations are also seeking an expan-
sion of the U.S. quota for sugar.10 5 A further obstacle within the
CARICOM nations is its high revenue reliance on taxes on interna-
tional transactions (see Table 3). With these sizeable caveats, the
CARICOM group meets the preconditions for a trade agreement.
C. Subject Matter
Broadly speaking, the U.S.-Canada FTA provides the best
guide to the ultimate content of trade agreements negotiated be-
tween the United States and Latin nations. What is actually
achieved in the U.S.-Mexico agreement will probably provide the
best guide to the first stage of future agreements with Latin
countries.
In the first stage, tariffs will be phased-out over periods not
longer than ten years, but in some cases the cuts will be asymmet-
ric (that is, faster for the United States) and extended in duration,
to perhaps fifteen years. Predictably, once the phase-out is agreed,
accelerations will be negotiated. Quotas will also be liberalized, but
here idiosyncratic formulas with ample safeguards will be negoti-
ated sector by sector. In addition, the first stage will establish a
framework for dispute settlement, common rules of origin, and ad-
ministrative procedures, consistent with the U.S.-Canada FTA.
Beyond that, other items may be postponed to later stages,
but not indefinitely. In large part, the United States agenda will
consist of unfinished business from the Uruguay Round: intellec-
tual property protection, rules against distortions to investment
(local content and export performance requirements), national
treatment for services, and better discipline on subsidies.
On a longer time table, the negotiators will address key social
104. Bush Lauds Free-Market Economy in Chile, Promises Closer Relations, Wash.
Post, Dec. 7, 1990, at A-53, col. 6. Other official U.S. statements single out Chile for talks
right after Mexico. See Chile Seeks Closer U.S. Trade Ties, supra note 83 at A-10, col. 4.
105. Region Assesses Impact of CBI-II, supra note 76, at 4.
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issues: environment, wages, and labor standards. 1 6 Already now,
on the eve of U.S.-Mexican FTA negotiations, American fears are
focused on the maquiladoras in Mexico. Lower wages and lax
health and safety standards are luring companies into border
plants. The environmental issues of hazardous waste disposal, sew-
age treatment by border cities such as Tijuana, local air pollution
and greenhouse gases, and saline water flowing from the United
States to Mexico cannot be indefinitely postponed. It appears that,
if trade agreements go forward with Mexico and other Latin na-
tions, they will be accompanied by social pacts. At this stage, the
prospective content of these pacts is nebulous, but the pacts will at
least call for increased enforcement of existing social and environ-
mental legislation, higher standards, and regular monitoring.
106. The Lome Conventions between the European Community and former colonies in
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, might serve as a useful model. African, Caribbean and
Pacific States - European Economic Community Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783
(1990). The Lome Conventions established an institutional framework for regular public and
private sector contacts on a wide variety of issues, including the environment, education,
and infrastructure. See generally I.K. Minta, The Lome Convention and the New Interna-
tional Economic Order, 27 How. L. J. 953 (1984).
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Table I. Regional trade flows in Latin America, 1983 and 1989 (millions of dollars)
1983 1989 % change from
1983 to 1989
% of % of % of % of
Imports Total Exports Total Imports Total Exports Total Imports Exports
SOUTHERN CONEa 22,410 100 31,021 100 26,265 100 55,358 100 17 78
Intra-regional 2,010 6 2,395 8 4,599 18 4,244 8 129 77
Central America 0 0 69 0 5 0 185 0 n.a. 169
Andean Pact 1,397 5 970 3 755 3 1,527 3 (46 57
CARICOMd 78 0 85 0 76 0 189 0 (3) 123
United States 3,670 12 6,098 20 6,276 24 9,741 18 71' 60
Mexico 321 1 799 3 449 2 632 1 40 (21)
Canada 674 2 430 1 694 3 1,094 2 3 154
Chile 302 1 415 1 700 3 1,010 2 132 143
All other 13,959 45 19,761 64 12,712 48 36,737 66 (9) 86
CENTRAL AMERICA
b  4,608 100 3,847 100 6,406 100 4,513 100 39 17
Intra-regional 684 15 749 19 571 9 723 16 (17) (3)
Southern Cone 48 1 9 0 221 3 9 0 360 0
Andean Pact 281 6 114 3 423 7 37 1 51 (68)
CAPRICOM 175 4 54 1 35 1 37 1 (80) (31)
United States 1,494 32 1,584 41 2,532 40 2,277 50 69 44
Mexico 442 10 31 1 375 6 30 1 (15) (2)
Canada 73 2 29 1 86 1 181 4 17 517
Chile 7 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 51 (67)
All other 1,403 30 1,277 33 2,152 34 1,219 27 53 (4)
ANDEAN PACTC 14,785 100 23,428 100 15,601 100 24,825 100 12 6
Intra-regional 909 6 809 3 796 5 1,130 5 (12) 40
Central America 56 0 267 1 38 0 407 2 (32) 52
Southern Cone 1,110 8 1,087 5 1,427 9 738 3 29 (32)
CARICOM 189 1 328 1 24 0 1,190 5 (87) 263
United States 5,924 40 8,654 37 6,432 39 11,732 47 9 36
Mexico 228 2 36 0 346 2 128 1 52 256
Canada 576 4 655 3 422 3 524 2 (27) (20)
Chile 187 1 303 1 267 2 419 2 43" 38
All other 5,606 38 11,289 48 6,849 41 8,557 34 22 (24)
CHILE 2,968 100 3,850 100 6,496 100 8,191 100 119 113
Southern Cone 421 14 292 8 1,146 18 630 8 172 115
Central America 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 0 n.a. n.a.
Andean Group 324 11 156 4 502 8 354 4 55 126
Caribbean E.C. 120 4 0 0 13 0 0 0 (89). n.a.
United States 704 24 1,083 28 1,283 20 1,616 20 82 49
Mexico 17 1 1 0 88 1 28 0 422 n.a.
Canada 61 2 60 2 142 2 56 1 133 (7)
All other 1,321 45 2,257 59 3,322 51 5,496 67 151 144
" Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
b Costa Rica, El Salvador. Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
C Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela
d 13 Caribbean countries
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook 1990, Country Tables
US Department of Commerce, US Trade 1990
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Table 2. Mexico's Regional Trading Partners,
1980 and 1990 (% of total trade)
1980 1989a 1980 1989a
United States 64.7 63.3 61.6 67.0
Canada 0.8 2.4 1.8 1.8
Japan 4.3 7.1 5.1 5.3
Other industrial
countries 15.6 16.3 17.3 16.3
Latin America
and 6.9 5.2 4.2 4.2
Caribbean
Other developing
countries 5.8 3.6 1.6 2.4
Otherb 2.0 2.1 8.3 3.1
aEstimated
bUSSR and other non-members
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics,
Yearbook 1987, and 1990.
Table 3. Quantitative Indicators of Preconditions for Entry into a Free Trade Agreement
Average
Absolute Taxes on
Average change in the International
Inflation real effective Transactions
Rate exchange rate late 1980s (%
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Andean Pact (ANCOM)
Bolivia 48.0 4.6 12.6
Colombia 29.9 3.5 11.2
Ecuador 94.5 18.4 n.a.
Peru over 14.3 21.5
100.0
Venezuela 66.0 14.0 23.4
Central American Common
Market (CACM)
El Salvador 22.5 n.a. 21.1
Guatemala 12.0 n.a. 37.2
Honduras 5.3 n.a. n.a.
Costa Rica 17.8 6.0 21.1
Nicaragua n.a. 20.3 16.9
Southern Cone
Brazil over 16.8 1.6
100.0
Argentina over 13.2 10.3
100.0
Uruguay over 5.1 13.6
100.0
Paraguay 29.4 14.1 12.0
Chile 16.3 4.3 9.9
Selected Caribbean
Economia Community (CARICOM)
Bahamas 3.7 1.8 58.0
Barbados 4.0 n.a. 13.8
Caymen Islands n.a. n.a. 42.1
Guyana 27.8 25.6 10.0
Jamaica 9.7 n.a. 4.1
Netherlands Antilles 2.3 3.9 24.4
St. Kitts & Nevis 1.8 n.a. 26.0
St. Lucia 1.9 4.1 33.6
St. Vincent n.a. 3.1 43.6
Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1990;
JP Morgan, World Financial Markets, July 1990
IMF, International Financial Statistics, Novenber 1990
